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The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of peer monitoring on generosity
in boys and girls aged 6–12 years. A total of 120 elementary school students played a
one-shot dictator game (DG) with and without peer monitoring by classmates. Children
decided how to divide 10 chocolates between themselves and a classmate either in a
condition in which their allocations were visible to their peers, or in private. While the
effect of peer monitoring on the allocation amount in the DG was clearly present in
boys, it was not observed in girls. Furthermore, the effect of peer monitoring in boys
appeared at the age of 9 years. These results suggest that the motivation to draw
peers’ attention plays a stronger role for older boys than for girls or younger boys. The
potential roles of higher-order theory of mind, social roles, and emergence of secondary
sex characteristics on the influence of peer monitoring on generosity shown by boys are
discussed.
Keywords: generosity, observer effects, economic game, children, sex difference

Introduction
People are highly motivated to build and maintain a good reputation, paying a great deal of attention
to social evaluations and keeping these evaluations positive in nature (Fehr, 2004; Bénabou and
Tirole, 2006; Izuma et al., 2010; Izuma, 2012). Consistent with these findings, a number of studies
have shown that people tend to behave in a more generous and pro-social manner when they are
being observed by others. This tendency occurs not only in adults (Bereczkei et al., 2007; Iredale et al.,
2008; Izuma et al., 2010; Van Vugt and Iredale, 2013) but also in children (Engelmann et al., 2012,
2013; Houser et al., 2012; Leimgruber et al., 2012; Fujii et al., 2015). The tendency for people to behave
in a more pro-social manner when they are observed by others, and thus may accrue reputation, is
so strong that it can be elicited even by subtle cues of monitoring such as pictures of eyes (Haley and
Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Mifune et al., 2010; Keller and Pfattheicher, 2011; Oda et al., 2011;
Ekström, 2012; Nettle et al., 2013) and even three dots in a “watching eyes” configuration (Rigdon
et al., 2009). Sensitivity to monitoring by others is thought to be a psychological mechanism evolved
to help humans adapt to social environments where reputation is extremely important in acquiring
resources (Milinski et al., 2002).
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The evolutionary basis for sensitivity to peer monitoring
has been explained by two theories: indirect reciprocity (e.g.,
Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998) and signaling
theory (e.g., Zahavi, 1975; Roberts, 1998). According to the
perspective of indirect reciprocity, people are thought to have a
strong motivation to build a good reputation in social exchange
domains in order to elicit favors from third parties, thus people
become sensitive to monitoring by others. Consistent with this
notion, studies have shown that people tend to base their
behaviors on how others have behaved in the past (Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000) and that generous people receive more assistance
from third-parties (Kato-Shimizu et al., 2013). Signaling theory
proposes that people can use costly signals, such as by giving
generous allocations to others, to honestly signal their cooperative
nature. One instance of signaling theory is the handicap principle,
which proposes that for males (who typically are tasked with
demonstrating their fitness to females) generosity to others
represents a signal of quality in the mate choice domain (Zahavi,
1975; Roberts, 1998). That is, showing generosity to others is a
costly signal of mate quality, and enhancing reputation in this
domain will allow more access to reproductive opportunities for
males in particular. While the former theory predicts the effect of
peer monitoring on generosity in both men and women, the latter
theory predicts sex differences.
Although a number of studies have demonstrated the
development of generosity in children (Benenson et al., 2007;
Fehr et al., 2008; Gummerum et al., 2008), none have examined
the effect of peer monitoring. Thus, in this study we sought
to examine the emergence of sensitivity to peer monitoring
in elementary school-age children. We specifically sought to
examine whether peer monitoring effects would emerge around
the age of 9–10 years of age, an age group associated with the
development of higher order theory of mind (ToM), thought to
be the cognitive basis for representing how others think about
one’s self (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2008), and is
thus a requirement for attention to monitoring by peers.
We also sought to examine potential sex differences in the
development of sensitivity to peer monitoring among older
elementary school-age children. Although five studies have
examined the effect of peer monitoring in 5-year-old children,
none of these studies have reported sex differences (Engelmann
et al., 2012, 2013; Leimgruber et al., 2012; Fujii et al., 2015).
However, several studies of adults have reported sex differences
(Iredale et al., 2008; Rigdon et al., 2009; Van Vugt and Iredale,
2013). For example, Rigdon et al. (2009) showed that the effect
of three dots in a watching eye configuration, proposed to suggest
monitoring from others, on generosity in a dictator game (DG)
was observed only in male participants. Furthermore, several
studies have shown that men tend to give more money to another
person in the DG (Iredale et al., 2008) and contribute more
to the group in the public goods game (Van Vugt and Iredale,
2013), particularly when observed by women. More recently,
Raihani and Smith (2015) showed that men were more likely
to increase donations to fundraisers when donating to attractive
female volunteers, particularly in response to large donations
made by other men. Together, these results indicate that adult men
are highly sensitive to monitoring and may try to appeal to others
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(particularly to women) by demonstrating their generosity when
they are monitored by others.
Thus, in this study we examine in elementary school-age
boys and girls in order to examine whether sensitivity to peer
monitoring develops during this developmental period, which
coincides with the emergence of higher order ToM and the onset
of puberty. We also sought to examine sex differences to examine
whether sensitivity to peer monitoring in adult men shown in
prior studies (e.g., Iredale et al., 2008; Rigdon et al., 2009; Van
Vugt and Iredale, 2013; Raihani and Smith, 2015) also emerges at
this developmental period. To do so, we used a simple economic
game known as the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986), widely
used in other developmental literature (Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr
et al., 2008; Gummerum et al., 2008; Engelmann et al., 2013; Fujii
et al., 2015), to measure generosity in children.

Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The ethical committee at the Center for Experimental Research
in Social Sciences, Hokkaido University approved this study and
consent was obtained from all the students and teacher at the
elementary school. The methods were carried out in accordance
with the approved guidelines.

Participants
A total of 120 children (60 girls and 60 boys; mean age = 9.2,
SD = 1.5) attending a private elementary school in Japan
participated in this study. Participants were recruited from five
grades: second grade (12 girls and 12 boys; mean age = 7.1 years,
SD = 0.3), third grade (12 girls and 12 boys; mean age = 8.3 years,
SD = 0.4), fourth grade (12 girls and 12 boys; mean age = 9.4 years,
SD = 0.5), fifth grade (12 girls and 12 boys; mean age = 10.2 years,
SD = 0.4), and sixth grade (12 girls and 12 boys; mean
age = 11.2 years, SD = 0.4).

Dictator Game
All participants played a one-shot DG. In each session, 12 children
from the same grade and class but of mixed sex (six boys
and six girls) played the game in a quiet room. Only a male
experimenter and 12 children were in the room, and the room
was closed such that individuals not involved in the study could
not observe participants. At the beginning of the experiment,
the 12 children sat on chairs at their desks arranged in a circle
and were told the rules of the DG by the experimenter, who
stood at the center of the desks. After describing of the game,
the experimenter orally confirmed participants’ understanding of
the rules of the DG. Then each child received 10 coin chocolates
from the experimenter and was tasked with deciding how to divide
these chocolates between him/herself and a recipient. A box, an
envelope, and a photograph of all classmates were placed on each
desk (Figure 1). All children were told that one of the classmates in
the photo would be randomly assigned the role of the recipient of
the allocated chocolates after the experiment. To remove potential
expectations of reciprocity, participants were informed that they
would not be told which child received the allocated chocolates.
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FIGURE 1 | Photograph of the top of a desk in the private condition
(left, box with lid for the recipients’ chocolates; center, envelope for
the child’s own chocolates and image of classmates; right, 10
chocolates).

FIGURE 2 | Photograph of the experimental environment in the private
condition. In the public condition, the vertical plastic boards and the
lids of the boxes were removed.

Based on the significant interaction, a 5 × 2 [Grade (2, 3,
4, 5, and 6) × Condition (private = 0, public = 1)] twoway ANOVA was conducted separately for each sex. In boys,
significant main effects of grade, F(4, 50) = 5.74, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.315, and condition, F (1, 50) = 10.86, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.178,
as well as a significant interaction effect, F(4, 50) = 5.51,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.306, were observed (Figure 3B). A post hoc test
revealed that the allocation amount in the public condition was
significantly higher than it was in the private condition from the
fourth to the sixth grade after the Bonferroni correction (fourth
grade: p = 0.002, fifth grade: p = 0.001, sixth grade: p = 0.033).
For girls, a significant effect of grade was observed, F(4, 50) = 3.72,
p = 0.010, η2p = 0.229, while the effect of condition, F(1, 50) = 3.07,
p = 0.086, η2p = 0.058, and the interaction, F(4, 50) = 0.74,
p = 0.568, η2p = 0.056, did not reach significance (Figure 3C).

Children were told that, if they wanted to give the chocolates to a
recipient, they should put the chocolates into the box, but if they
wanted to keep the chocolates for themselves, that they should put
them into the envelope.
Half of the participants played the DG in the private condition,
and the remaining participants played the DG in the public
condition, resulting in five sessions for each condition. Each
condition was conducted alternately. In the private condition,
vertical, light orange plastic boards obscured each desk and a lid
covered the box, and the experimenter told participants not to
look at what the other children were doing. Thus, the children
could not see how many chocolates their peers put into the
box (Figure 2). In the public condition, the plastic boards and
the lids were absent and the children were able to observe the
number of chocolates that the other children put into the box.
The experimenter stood in the center of the room during the
entire experiment, and thus he could not see the amount of the
chocolates in the box in the private condition. All children made
their decisions at the same time, and signaled to the experimenter
by raising their hand when they had completed the task, at which
point the experimenter collected the boxes. After the all children
had finished their decision, they took the envelopes and left the
room.

Discussion
In this study, we examined the effect of peer monitoring on
generosity in elementary school-aged children, and observed
three major findings. First, the amount of the allocation in the
DG increased with age in both boys and girls, consistent with
previous studies (Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008). Second,
the effect of peer monitoring was observed only in boys who
were at least 9–10 years of age (i.e., forth to sixth grade). While
the amount of the dictator’s offer to the recipient in the public
condition increased with age in boys, it remained low in the
private condition. Third, in girls, the amount of the dictator’s offer
to the recipient in both conditions increased with age, and an
effect of monitoring was not observed. These results indicate that
peer monitoring enhances generosity in boys but not in girls, and
further, that older boys are more sensitive to monitoring by peers.
This is the first study to show differences between boys and girls
in the effect of peer monitoring on generosity using the DG.
There are a number of theoretical frameworks which may help
to interpret differences in the development of the sensitivity to

Results
The mean allocations by sex and grade in each condition are
presented in Figure 3. A 5 × 2 × 2 Grade [(2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) × Sex
(girl = 0, boy = 1)] × Condition (private = 0, public = 1) threeway analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the allocations revealed
significant main effects of grade, F(4, 100) = 8.44, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.252, condition, F(1, 100) = 12.41, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.11, sex,
F(1, 100) = 6.13, p = 0.015, η2p = 0.058, and a significant three-way
interaction (grade × sex × condition), F(4, 100) = 4.28, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.146.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean level of dictator’s offer in each condition. All children (A), boys (B), and girls (C). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.

peer monitoring between boys and girls. For instance, social role
theory (Hindin, 2007) may help to explain gender differences
in children’s generosity. In social role theory, human behavior
is thought to be strongly affected by social roles constructed by
one’s culture, and studies stemming from this perspective have
shown that men tend to be helpful in the public activities (Eagly
and Crowley, 1986; Eagly, 1987), and that that this tendency
strengthens in the presence of an audience (Eagly, 1987). While
this theory does not account for age differences observed in this
study, it is possible that older boys in our study might be more
sensitive to social roles and were thus more generous to others.
Another factor which may explain the emergence of sensitivity
to peer monitoring is the development of higher-order ToM,
which is considered the cognitive basis for the representation of
one’s own reputation in the eyes of others (Amodio and Frith,
2006; Frith and Frith, 2008). In order to understand one’s own
reputation, it is necessary to consider what others think of oneself.
Thus, sensitivity to peer monitoring requires the development
of higher order ToM. Consistent with this interpretation,
Houser et al. (2012) demonstrated a peer monitoring effect on
contributions to group members using a modified social dilemma
game in children 9 years and older. Although Houser et al. (2012)
did not investigate sex differences in peer monitoring effects in
children, our study clearly showed significant differences between
boys and girls. This discrepancy may be explained by the different
games; while the DG was used in our study to measure children’s
generosity, a modified social dilemma game that involved waiting
for a reward was used in Houser et al. (2012)’s study. The latter
study did not measure children’s generosity per se, but rather
their endurance (Curry et al., 2008) and general trust (Yamagishi,
1988).
While we cannot conclude that the development of sensitivity
to peer monitoring in our study is due to the emergence of
secondary sexual characteristics and in the older boys, this result is
consistent with the handicap principle which predicts that boys are
strongly motivated to display their generosity as a costly signal to
appeal to girls. As testosterone secretion increases with the onset
of secondary sexual characteristics and sexual maturity, secondary
sexual characteristics in boys emerge around 9–10 years of age
(Matsuo, 1993; Herman-Giddens et al., 2001, 2012), at which
point testosterone increases, and boys start showing interest in
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the opposite sex (assuming a heterosexual orientation). Thus, if
sex differences in the effect of peer monitoring on generosity are
impacted by testosterone, these differences should theoretically
appear around the age of 9–10 years of age.
The interpretation that increases in generosity shown by males
in response to peer monitoring is related to secondary sexual
characteristics is consistent with findings of several studies of
adults, which have shown that generosity in the context of
economic games is associated with male sex hormones (e.g.,
testosterone; Zak et al., 2009; Boksem et al., 2013) as well as
masculinized facial structure (Stirrat and Perrett, 2012), thought
to be an index of male hormone (e.g., testosterone) concentration.
These studies provide some evidence to support the notion that
generosity signals quality in mating domains, consistant with
the handicap principle, particularly for men. While this study
found the development of sensitivity to peer monitoring was
consistent with the timing of the onset of secondary sexual
characteristics in boys, further research is needed to measure
testosterone concentration and to examine whether testosterone
levels are associated with the increase in the effect of monitoring
on generosity in boys.
Furthermore, other studies might examine whether the effects
of this study are impacted by culture. Indeed, social role
theory and sexual signaling theories are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, as the manner in which humans signal quality in mating
domains is highly dependent on culturally defined roles. For
instance, in some cultures men might drive fast and dangerous
cars, and in other cultures men might hunt dangerous game
animals as a costly signal to appeal to potential mates. As an
example, research on the “Culture of Honor” in the American
South has suggested that higher levels of violence observed in
white men in this region is associated with men’s (erroneous)
perceptions of the extent to which women prefer men who react
violently to threats to reputation (e.g., Vandello et al., 2009). Thus,
cultural variation norms regarding acceptable gender roles can
influence the types of costly signals relevant in mating domains.
Overall, this study found evidence suggesting that, not only
does generosity in children in the DG increase with age, the
effect of monitoring on generosity emerges in boys around
9 years of age. We hope this study will encourage future research
examining contributions of potential mechanisms, such as male
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sex hormones, social roles, or the development of higher order
theory of mind, which may account for these results.
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